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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-2128 
 ___________ 
 
AMERICAN BOARD OF SURGERY, INC, 
 
v. 
 
KEITH A. LASKO; AMERICAN BOARD OF GENERAL SURGERY;  
ACADEMY OF SURGERY AND AMERICAN COUNSEL OF GENERAL 
SURGEONS; AMERICAN COUNCIL OF SURGICAL SPECIALISTS 
 
Keith A. Lasko, 
                                    Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-01857) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
 Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 3, 2013 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: July 25, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 
 Pro se defendant-appellant Keith Lasko challenges an order finding him in civil 
contempt.  Plaintiff-appellee American Board of Surgery, Inc. (ABS) challenges our 
jurisdiction and requests that we dismiss this appeal.  For the following reasons, we will 
exercise jurisdiction and summarily affirm. 
I. 
 ABS sued Lasko in 2010, alleging that he had engaged in unfair and deceptive 
trade practices by creating corporate shells with names similar to other, respected medical 
organizations, for the purpose of selling illegitimate certifications and memberships 
under the names of those groups.  ABS eventually moved for sanctions in the form of a 
default judgment, as Lasko had, inter alia, flouted his discovery obligations—in one 
instance, by failing to appear for a previously scheduled deposition at significant expense 
to ABS.   
 Agreeing that sanctions were warranted, the District Court granted a default 
judgment in favor of ABS, awarding damages and attorney fees.  Also, pursuant to the 
Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1116(a)), the District Court enjoined Lasko from a) using ―any 
and all of‖ an enumerated list of organization names; b) using three specified websites; c) 
selling status-related privileges ―related to any purported medical organization including, 
but not limited to‖ the organizations previously listed; and d) soliciting ―certificates, use 
of letters, membership, or diplomat, fellow, or board of director status related to any 
purported medical organization including, but not limited to‖ the organizations previously 
listed.  See Order 5–8, ECF No. 46 (emphasis added).  The District Court also entered 
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judgment in favor of ABS.  
 About a year and a half later, ABS filed a motion for civil contempt, alleging that 
Lasko continued ―to engage in the exact same unlawful conduct.‖  Mem. of Law 1, ECF 
No. 48.  ABS attached to its motion a letter from an organization called the ―National 
Academy of Medicine,‖ which was ―strikingly similar to [materials] previously used by 
Lasko in connection with . . . the . . . entities identified in the Court’s Order.‖  Mem. of 
Law. 4–5; see also Ex. C, ECF No. 48-1.    
 The District Court held a hearing on the contempt motion, at which Lasko 
appeared pro se.  ABS explained that while the injunction did not prohibit the use of the 
name ―National Academy of Medicine,‖ it did prohibit, among other things, the ―use of 
letters‖ in connection with ―any purported medical organization.‖  Tr. 8:24–9:5.  Lasko 
conceded that he had received the District Court’s final order, see Tr. 15:2–4, and did not 
dispute that he created the National Academy of Medicine, see Tr. 16:10–16.  He further 
essentially admitted to sending the letters in question.  Tr. 20:6–8.  Throughout, Lasko 
insisted that his conduct was covered under the religious protections of the First 
Amendment.  See, e.g., Tr. 41:19–24 (―THE COURT: So your position is that the first 
amendment, freedom of religion . . . allows you to send these letters?  Is that your 
position?  MR. LASKO: Yes, it is.‖).   
 Having taken testimony, the District Court asked ABS to clarify what it was 
requesting from the Court.  Tr. 47: 6–9.  In addition to fees and other sanctions, ABS 
asked for the Court to issue a more specific directive covering the National Academy of 
Medicine and other organizations Lasko had begun to use since judgment was entered.  
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See Tr. 47:18–48:3.   
 Ultimately, the District Court found Lasko in contempt and enjoined him from 
―us[ing] . . . the names National Academy of Medicine, American Institute of Geriatrics, 
National Academy of Dental Sciences, American Academy of Dental Sciences and 
United States Academy of Dental Sciences for any purpose.‖  Order ¶ 3, ECF No. 54; see 
also Tr. 51:6–9 (finding Lasko’s conduct to be ―clearly, definitively and one hundred 
percent‖ prohibited by the original injunction).  The District Court declined to levy 
sanctions ―at this time,‖ but allowed ABS to present ―evidence of further violations of the 
Court’s orders‖ within a six-month time frame, at which point a ―hearing‖ would be 
convened ―to determine the appropriate penalty.‖  Order ¶ 4; see also Tr. 55:19–24 
(announcing an intent to ―maintain[] jurisdiction‖ over the matter of sanctions).  Lasko 
filed a timely notice of appeal.
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II. 
 In its summary-action response, ABS suggests that we lack jurisdiction over this 
appeal.  We must determine our own jurisdiction before reaching the merits of the case.  
See Elliott v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).  
 ABS argues that the contempt order is not final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it 
did not impose sanctions and ―kept the matter open for six months.‖  Thus, according to 
ABS, ―the Order from which Mr. Lasko seeks to appeal is a non-appealable interlocutory 
                                                 
1
 The notice of appeal is timely filed from the order granting ABS’s motion for civil contempt.  
See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).  It is not timely filed in relation to the District Court’s original 
default judgment order, despite the Court’s noncompliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.  Thus, we 
lack jurisdiction over the default judgment and original permanent injunction. 
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order, which this Court lacks jurisdiction to review.‖  Resp. 2. 
 A post-judgment civil contempt order is considered a final, immediately 
appealable order under § 1291 once a finding of contempt is made and a sanction 
imposed.  See United States v. Gonzales, 531 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(collecting cases); see also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fraternal Ass’n of Steel Haulers, 601 F.2d 
1269, 1273 (3d Cir. 1979).  Having found Lasko in contempt, the District Court explicitly 
retained jurisdiction to make a future determination of sanctions, but not necessarily a 
redetermination of contempt, if Lasko persisted in violating the permanent injunction.  
We are in accord with ABS that the District Court’s order lacks the ―elements of 
operativeness and consequence necessary‖ to be a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 
precluding an exercise of jurisdiction under that section.  Consumers Gas & Oil v. 
Farmland Indus., 84 F.3d 367, 370 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 However, certain nonfinal interlocutory orders, such as those modifying 
injunctions, are appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  Also, ―one who is a party 
may appeal from a civil contempt order in connection with some other appealable order.‖  
United States v. Spectro Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175, 1179 (3d Cir. 1976).  Moreover, 
―[o]nce vested with section 1292(a)(1) jurisdiction, we may also review the district 
court’s finding of civil contempt.‖  Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers of 
Am., Local 249 v. W. Pa. Motor Carriers Ass’n., 660 F.2d 76, 81 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing 
Spectro Foods, 544 F.2d at 1179).  We must therefore determine whether the District 
Court’s contempt order contains elements that would bring it within the ambit of 
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§ 1292(a)(1). 
 ―For an interlocutory order to be appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) . . . as 
an order modifying an injunction, two requirements appear to be necessary and must be 
satisfied: (i) the original or prior order must have been injunctive in character, and (ii) 
that injunction must have been modified in some respect by the order from which the 
appeal has been taken.‖  Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d 1340, 1348 (3d Cir. 1978).  An 
injunction is ―affirmatively defined as follows: [o]rders that are directed to a party, 
enforceable by contempt, and designed to accord or protect some or all of the substantive 
relief sought by a complaint in more than a temporary fashion.‖  Cohen v. Bd. of 
Trustees, 867 F.2d 1455, 1465 n.9 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc) (internal quotation marks, 
alterations, and citation omitted).  We construe appealability pursuant to § 1292 
narrowly, see N.J. State Nurses Ass’n v. Treacy, 834 F.2d 67, 70–71 (3d Cir. 1987), and 
must pay special attention to the distinction between a ―modification‖ of an injunction, 
which is appealable, and the clarification of one, which is not.  See Entegris, Inc. v. Pall 
Corp., 490 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  In so doing, we must ―examine the 
substance of the order rather than merely its language.‖  U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Asbestospray, Inc., 182 F.3d 201, 207 (3d Cir. 1999).  
 We conclude that the District Court’s contempt order qualified, in part, as a 
―modification‖ of a permanent injunction, and is thus appealable under § 1292(a)(1).  The 
original order granted a Lanham Act injunction consisting of two categories of 
restrictions: exhaustive, closed lists of names and websites that Lasko could not ―use‖; 
and nonexhaustive, illustrative lists of ―purported medical organization[s]‖ on whose 
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behalf Lasko was prohibited from soliciting and marketing.  The contempt order added 
five names to the previously exhaustive list of organizations whose monikers and 
operations were forbidden to be used for any purpose.  This changed the character of the 
injunction.  For example, while solicitation on behalf of the ―National Academy of 
Dental Sciences‖ would fall under the terms of the original permanent injunction, merely 
using the name would not.  Under the contempt order’s modification, however, use itself 
would be prohibited.  By expanding the scope of the permanent injunction, the District 
Court ―modified‖ it within the meaning of § 1292(a)(1) and our prior case law, rendering 
the contempt order appealable. 
 Therefore, we will exercise jurisdiction over the contempt order pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and must therefore deny ABS’s submission to the extent that it was 
a motion to dismiss.
2
  Both the modification of an injunctive decree and a finding of civil 
contempt are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon v. 
Longhorn Steaks, 106 F.3d 355, 364 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); Harris v. City of 
Phila., 47 F.3d 1311, 1321 (3d Cir. 1995).  Our jurisdiction does not otherwise extend to 
―the merits of the underlying [permanent injunction or judgment],‖ which ―may not be 
called into question in a post-judgment civil contempt proceeding.‖  Halderman v. 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc).   
III. 
  We consider first the finding of civil contempt itself, which must be supported by 
                                                 
2
 Because we can exercise jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1), we need not reach whether the 
collateral order doctrine also would permit this appeal.  See Asbestospray, 182 F.3d at 207–08. 
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clear and convincing evidence but will otherwise ―only be disturbed if there is an error of 
law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.‖  Harris, 47 F.3d at 1321.  ―To prove civil 
contempt the court must find that (1) a valid court order existed, (2) the defendant had 
knowledge of the order, and (3) the defendant disobeyed the order.‖  Id. at 1326 (citing  
Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 871 (3d Cir. 1990)).  ―[G]ood faith is not a 
defense to civil contempt.‖  Robin Woods Inc. v. Woods, 28 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 
1994).  However, ambiguities in an order are construed in favor the charged party.  Id. 
 As discussed above, Lasko admitted knowledge of the permanent injunction and 
had not otherwise challenged its validity.  His arguments before the District Court (which 
he repeats on appeal) amounted to reliance on the allegedly religious character of his 
solicitations, which he maintained should carve out an exception for his conduct under 
the Constitution.  He failed to explain, however, how religious character was relevant.  
To the contrary, ABS showed that, following his being enjoined by the District Court, 
Lasko sent out a solicitation under the name ―National Academy of Medicine‖ that 
mimicked precisely the conduct to which the ABS originally objected: questionable 
representation as a ―medical organization‖ with a conspicuous element of remuneration 
from the honorary titles and degrees allegedly bestowed.  The July 21, 2012 letter 
informed the recipient of his candidacy for an alleged ―award‖ that would elevate him to 
the ―Scientific Advisory Board‖ of the ―National Academy of Medicine‖—for a fee, of 
course.  This communication falls squarely within the conduct prohibited by the 
permanent injunction, and took place after the  District Court enjoined Lasko.  Hence, the 
District Court did not err in finding Lasko to be in contempt. 
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 Next, we consider whether the modification of the injunction ―effectuate[d] or 
thwart[ed] the purpose behind the permanent injunction.‖  Sierra Club v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 732 F.2d 253, 257 (2d Cir. 1984).  Although modification of the 
injunction was arguably unnecessary (as the District Court itself remarked during the 
contempt hearing) to prevent any further misconduct, the District Court has broad 
discretion in fashioning a remedy.  Woods, 28 F.3d at 399 (citation omitted).  On the 
present record, and especially given the character of the unchallenged, original permanent 
injunction, we cannot say that the addition of five more shell companies amounted to an 
abuse of discretion. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we find no substantial question to be presented by this 
appeal, and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 
650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. 
I.O.P. 10.6.  To the extent that Lasko’s submissions request independent relief, they are 
denied. 
